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Abstract 
Previous research on counterfactual thoughts about prevention 
suggests that people tend to focus on enabling rather than 
causing agents. However, research has also demonstrated that 
people have a preference for mutating controllable events. We 
explore whether counterfactual thinking about enablers is 
distinct from ‘undoing’ controllable events. We presented 
participants with scenarios in which a cause and an enabler 
contribute to a negative outcome. Participants were randomly 
assigned to one of four groups in which we systematically 
manipulated the controllability of the cause and the enabler. 
Participants generated counterfactuals which focused on the 
cause or the enabler and completed blame ratings for the 
cause and the enabler. The results indicate that participants 
had a preference for mutating the enabling relation, apart from 
in one condition where the cause was controllable and the 
enabler was uncontrollable. Participants tended to assign more 
blame to the cause than the enabler, regardless of 
controllability. The findings are discussed in the context of 
previous research on causal and counterfactual thinking.  
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Introduction 
The ability to consider what might have been (e.g., if I had 
arrived earlier I would have prevented the accident) is an 
important and pervasive part of everyday thought (e.g., 
Kahneman & Tversky, 1982; Byrne, 2005). Counterfactual 
thinking has implications for how we assign blame (Creyer 
& Guerhan, 1997), and in emotions such as guilt, shame and 
regret (Mandel, 2003). It is also important in helping people 
to learn from past mistakes (Roese, 1994). Counterfactual 
conditionals have been studied by philosophers (e.g., Lewis, 
1973), linguists (e.g., Athanasiadou & Dirven, 1997), 
psychologists (e.g., Kahneman & Tversky, 1982) and used 
in politics (e.g. Tetlock & Belkin, 1996) and artificial 
intelligence (e.g., Costello & McCarthy, 1999). 
Several decades of research into counterfactual thinking 
have revealed that the counterfactuals people generate in 
response to unexpected events follow regular patterns. 
Counterfactuals tend to focus on exceptional rather than 
routine events (Kahneman & Tversky, 1982), socially 
undesirable actions, rather than socially acceptable actions, 
(e.g., McCloy & Byrne, 2000; N'gbala & Branscombe, 
1995), actions rather than inactions (Kahneman & Tversky, 
1982) and the first event in a dependent causal sequence of 
events (Wells, Taylor, & Turtle, 1987).  
People’s counterfactual thoughts also tend to be about 
controllable rather than uncontrollable events, such as being 
home late due to the decision to go to the gym compared to 
being delayed due to having an asthma attack (Girotto, 
Legrenzi, & Rizzo, 1991). Previous research has also 
demonstrated that people focus on undoing enabling 
relations, rather than causes, in their counterfactual thoughts 
(N’gbala & Branscombe, 1995; Mandel & Lehman, 1996). 
Causes are the events that bring about an outcome, such as a 
spark that causes a fire, whereas enablers are the events that 
make it possible for a cause to have its effect, such as 
oxygen that makes it possible for the spark to cause a fire. 
However, it is not clear why this preference to think 
counterfactually about enablers exists. One possibility is 
that causes and enablers are fundamentally different. 
Another possibility, which we explore in this paper, is that 
enablers may be more controllable than causes.   
Causal and counterfactual thinking 
There has been a long standing controversy over how people 
distinguish between causes and enabling conditions (or 
enablers). A number of characteristics have been identified 
according to which causes and enablers tend to differ. 
Enablers tend to be constant (e.g., oxygen) and causes 
inconstant (Cheng & Novick, 1991), enablers also tend to be 
normal whereas causes tend to be out of the ordinary (Hart 
& Honoré (1959/1985) and furthermore, causes tend to be 
conversationally relevant whereas enablers tend not to be 
(Hilton & Erb, 1996). The problem with distinguishing 
between causes and enablers in this way is that these 
differences do not always explain the difference (e.g., 
Cheng & Novick, 1991, Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). 
Consider the following scenario: Laura threw a lighted 
cigarette into a bush. Just as the cigarette was going out, 
Mary threw petrol on it. The resulting fire burnt down the 
neighbor’s house. In this case both the enabler (the 
cigarette) and the cause (the petrol) are conversationally 
relevant, out of the ordinary and inconstant. There appears 
to be a difference between causes and enablers that goes 
beyond a simple distinction along some characteristics.  
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The mental model theory distinguishes between causes 
and enablers in a different way (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 
2001). Accordingly, causes and enablers are consistent with 
different possibilities and as a result they differ in meaning 
and in their logical implications. Causes are consistent with 
the following three possibilities: ‘cause and outcome’, ‘no 
cause and outcome’ (an alternative cause produced the 
outcome) and ‘no cause and no outcome’. Enablers are 
consistent with three different possibilities: ‘enabler and 
outcome’, ‘enabler and no outcome’, and ‘no enabler and no 
outcome’ (Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001). Frosch and 
Byrne (2006) also demonstrated that causes and enablers 
prime different possibilities. Hence, previous research 
demonstrates that people keep different possibilities in mind 
for causes and enablers.  
Causal and counterfactual thinking are closely linked as 
counterfactual thoughts about how events could have turned 
out differently are often of a causal nature. In order for 
counterfactual thoughts about how an outcome could have 
been different to make sense people must perceive a causal 
connection between the antecedent of the conditional and 
the consequent. For example a counterfactual such as ‘if the 
sky had not been blue Peter would not have broken the 
chair’ does not make sense unless people can perceive a 
causal link between the sky being blue and Peter breaking 
the chair. However, a counterfactual such as ‘if Mary had 
taken the shortcut then she would have arrived on time’ 
makes sense as people can immediately see the causal 
connection between the antecedent (‘Mary took the 
shortcut’) and the consequent (‘she arrived on time’).  
Psychologists have recognized that the relation between 
causal and counterfactual thoughts is complex (Byrne, 
2005). The relation between causal and counterfactual 
thoughts is in fact bidirectional. Causal relations imply 
certain counterfactuals and counterfactuals allow people to 
distinguish between correlation and causation by allowing 
them to assess whether an effect would have occurred had a 
particular event not happened (Sloman, 2005). Philosophers 
have also long debated the relation between causal and 
counterfactual thinking. Lewis (1973) suggests that a cause 
is something that makes a difference, a difference which 
would not have occurred had the cause not been present.  
Counterfactual thoughts influence beliefs about causality. 
Consider a story in which a couple, who were refused a lift 
by a taxi driver, died when their car drove off a collapsed 
bridge. People attribute a causal role to the taxi driver who 
refused them a lift when they know he drove across the 
bridge safely (and so they can think, ‘if only he had given 
them a lift’) but not when they know he also drove off the 
collapsed bridge (Wells & Gavanski, 1989). But people 
focus on different events when they think about the cause of 
the outcome, the collapsed bridge, and when they think 
about counterfactual alternatives, ‘if only the taxi driver had 
given them a lift’ (Mandel & Lehman, 1996). 
Counterfactual thoughts may tend to focus on enabling 
relations and thus focus on how an event could have been 
prevented whereas causal thoughts focus on strong causes 
(Byrne, 2005).  
Controllability or enablers? 
Research on counterfactual thinking has revealed certain 
regularities in the events people choose to mutate (see 
Byrne, 2005 for a review). As we have already indicated, 
one of these regularities is that people tend to generate 
counterfactuals about enablers (e.g., if only the 9/11 
terrorists had been prevented from getting on board) rather 
than about causes (e.g. if only the terrorists had had second 
thoughts). The question arises of whether people tend to 
mutate enablers because there is something special about 
them (e.g. Byrne, 2005) or whether enablers just tend to be 
perceived as more controllable. In the example above 
perhaps preventing the terrorists from boarding the plane is 
perceived as being more ‘controllable’ than the terrorists 
having second thoughts, and this is the reason why the 
enabler is undone rather than the enabler being special. 
Although previous research has indirectly addressed this 
question (e.g., N’gbala & Branscombe, 1995, Mandel & 
Lehman, 1996), methodological weakness such as the use of 
single scenarios, immoral causes or manipulating only the 
controllability of the enabler make it difficult to draw 
specific conclusions from these findings.  
Experiment 
The primary aim of this experiment was to examine how 
controllability affects the generation of counterfactuals 
about causes and enablers. In order to achieve this we 
systematically manipulated the controllability of both a 
cause and an enabler in bringing about a negative outcome 
in a series of scenarios. In addition, we also examined how 
blame ratings, foreseeability, and social acceptability ratings 
for each of the antecedent actions were related to the 
counterfactuals participants generated. Previous research 
indicates that these factors are related to counterfactual 
thinking (e.g, Mandel & Lehman, 1996, N’gbala & 
Branscombe, 1995, Lagnado & Channon, in submission). 
Method 
Materials and Design We first conducted a pilot study to 
identify suitable materials. There has been some debate over 
how people distinguish between causes and enablers (e.g., 
Goldvarg & Johnson-Laird, 2001) so we wanted to ensure 
that our materials clearly conveyed the two sorts of causal 
relations. We generated 18 vignettes which described two 
antecedent actions and a negative outcome (see Table 1). In 
each vignette we manipulated the controllability of each of 
the two causal events, which resulted in four different 
versions of each vignette: A. controllable cause and enabler, 
B. controllable cause and uncontrollable enabler, C. 
uncontrollable cause and enabler and D. uncontrollable 
cause and controllable enabler. All four versions of a 
scenario resulted in the same negative outcome. 
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Table 1: Controllable and uncontrollable causes and  
 enablers in a sample scenario 
 Controllable Uncontrollable 
Cause Anne decided to 
park on a double 
yellow line near the 
office building as 
this was the closest 
place to park. 
Anne decided to park 
on a double yellow line 
near the office building 
because it was an 
emergency and there 
was nowhere else to 
park. 
Enabler On the way back to 
the car Anne 
bumped into her 
friend and stopped 
for a chat. 
On the way back to the 
car Anne urgently 
needed to use the 
bathroom and returned 
to the office building. 
Outcome When Anne returned to the car she saw she 
had just been given a ticket. 
 
We used a within participants design for the pilot study 
and thus each participant saw at least four vignettes from 
each condition. For some of the materials the enabling 
action preceded the causal action and for some the causal 
action preceded the enabling action. We also included four 
filler items which described either two causes, or a cause 
and an irrelevant action. 
Participants were asked whether each of the two 
antecedent actions caused, enabled or had nothing to do 
with the outcome. At the top of each page we printed a 
definition for cause and enabler. It read as follows: ‘A cause 
brings about an outcome. An enabler makes it possible for 
an outcome to occur’. Participants were then asked to judge 
how controllable each of the actions was. These judgments 
were made on 7 point rating scales. We tested 31 
Psychology students who took part for course credit. There 
were 29 women and 2 men with a mean age of 24 (range 18-
51 years).  
For the main experiment, we identified 8 vignettes (see 
Appendix) for which participants identified cause and 
enabler with an average accuracy of 77% with a minimum 
acceptable level of 70%. The results of the controllability 
scales indicated that the causes and enablers were 
controllable (5.91 and 6.31) or uncontrollable (3.54 and 
3.97) as appropriate. We employed a between participants 
design and thus each participant was tested in only one of 
the four conditions; A: controllable cause and enabler (n = 
19); B: controllable cause and uncontrollable enabler (n = 
20); C: uncontrollable cause and enabler (n = 20); D: 
uncontrollable cause and controllable enabler (n = 19). 
Participants were asked to generate a counterfactual in 
response to each scenario, by completing the following 
sentence: “Things could have turned out differently: ‘If 
only’…”. We also gave participants a number of rating 
scales where we asked them to judge how causal each of the 
two antecedent events was, how much each of the events 
was to blame, how much they contributed to the outcome, 
how socially acceptable, and how foreseeable they were.  
 
Participants We tested 78 Psychology students who took 
part for course credit. There were 69 women and 9 men with 
a mean age of 21 (range 18-51 years).  
 
Procedure Participants completed the booklets in groups of 
up to 10 people. The experiment was divided into two parts. 
In the first part participants saw each of the eight vignettes 
and generated a counterfactual for each. In Part 2, they saw 
each vignette again (in different random orders) and were 
asked to answer the remaining questions (which were 
presented in different orders). 
Results 
The counterfactuals generated in the first part of the 
experiment were categorised as mutating either the cause, 
the enabler, both or other. Ninety-four percent of the 
counterfactuals generated either mutated the cause or the 
enabler, so our analysis focuses on these two categories. As 
can be seen in Figure 1, overall participants generated 
significantly more counterfactuals about enablers than 
causes (56% vs. 38%), t(77) = 3.58, p = .001, and this was 
the case for groups A, C and D (t(18) = 2.38, p = .029; t(19) 
= 2.37, p = .029; t(18) = 9.03, p < .001, respectively). In 
group B (cause controllable, enabler uncontrollable) 
participants generated significantly more counterfactuals 
about causes than enablers (57% vs. 37%), t(19) = 2.46, p = 
.024.  
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Figure 1: Percentages of counterfactuals relating to causes 
and enablers in each of the four conditions 
 
Results indicate that there was a significant difference 
between the four groups in the number of counterfactuals 
generated about causes, F (3,77) = 15.08, p < .001. Post hoc 
tests (Tukey) revealed that significantly more 
counterfactuals about causes were generated for version B 
(57%, cause controllable, enabler uncontrollable), than in 
the other versions, p ≤ .003 and the least generated were for 
version D (20%) (cause uncontrollable, enabler 
controllable), p ≤ .016. There was no significant difference 
in the number of counterfactuals generated about causes for 
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versions A (37%, controllable cause and enabler) and C 
(39%, uncontrollable cause and enabler), p = 1.00.  
Results for enablers similarly indicate that there was a 
significant difference between the four groups in the number 
of counterfactuals generated, F (3,77) = 8.39, p < .001. Post 
hoc tests (Tukey) showed that this difference was due to 
group B generating significantly less counterfactuals about 
enablers than any of the other groups (37%), p ≤ .03. 
Similar to the causes there was no significant difference in 
the number of counterfactuals generated about enablers for 
versions A (56%, controllable cause, controllable enabler) 
and C (59%, uncontrollable cause, uncontrollable enabler), 
p = 1.00. Although participants receiving version D tended 
to generate more counterfactuals about enablers than the 
other three versions this only reached significance when 
compared to version B, p < .001.  
 
Table 2: Mean ratings for the rating scales (measured on 7-
point rating scale) 
 A B C D 
Cause blame 5.96* 6.04* 5.08* 4.95 
Enabler blame 4.05 3.44 3.79 4.67 
Cause acceptability 2.62* 2.45* 3.22* 3.47* 
Enabler acceptability 4.97 5.07 4.59 4.38 
Cause causality 5.51* 5.43* 5.38* 5.29* 
Enabler causality 4.24 4.13 4.46 4.73 
Cause foreseeability 5.39* 5.36* 5.03* 4.69* 
Enabler foreseeability 3.09 3.17 3.26 3.69 
Cause contribution 6.36* 6.38* 6.11* 5.81* 
Enabler contribution 4.51 4.00 4.64 5.03 
* Significantly different to figure directly below 
A: cause and enabler both controllable 
B: cause controllable and enabler uncontrollable 
C: cause and enabler both uncontrollable 
D: cause uncontrollable and enabler controllable 
 
The mean ratings participants assigned for causes and 
enablers on the five rating scales are presented in Table 1. 
Participants assigned more blame to causes than enablers 
overall (5.51 vs. 3.98), t(77) = 10.60, p < .001. This was the 
case for versions A, B and C but not D: t(18) = 11.62, p ≤ 
.001; t(19) = 9.30, p ≤ .001; t(19) = 7.47, p ≤ .001; t(18) = 
1.21, p = .244, respectively. 
Participants also assigned more blame to controllable than 
uncontrollable events for both causes (A&B vs. C&D: 6.00 
vs. 5.01), t(76) = 5.80, p < .001, and enablers (A&D vs. 
B&C: 4.46 vs. 3.62), t(17) = 4.69, p < .001. 
Overall, causes were rated as more socially unacceptable 
than enablers (2.94 vs. 4.75), t(76) = 13.63, p < .001, and 
more foreseeable in bringing about the outcome (5.13 vs. 
3.30), t(76) = 17.98 p < .001. They were also rated as 
making a greater contribution to the outcome (6.17 vs. 
4.54), t(77) = 15.65, p < .001, and as having greater 
causality than enablers (5.40 vs. 4.39), t(76) = 5.36, p < 
.001. These results held for all four groups, p ≤ .022. 
Discussion 
The aim of the experiment was to examine whether the 
tendency to generate counterfactuals about enablers was due 
to the specific nature of enabling relations or whether it was 
more closely related to controllability. The results of our 
experiment suggest that when the controllability of causes 
and enablers is perceived to be comparable, i.e., both 
controllable or both uncontrollable, then participants had a 
preference to generate counterfactuals about the enabler. It 
was only in one condition, where the cause was controllable 
and the enabler was uncontrollable, that participants tended 
to generate counterfactuals about the cause rather than the 
enabler. These results therefore suggest that, all things being 
equal, people do prefer to generate counterfactuals about 
enablers rather than about causes. 
Byrne (2005) provides an explanation for why enablers 
tend to be more mutable than causes. She proposes that 
enablers are understood by keeping in mind two 
possibilities; enabler & outcome and no enabler & no 
outcome; whereas causes tend to be understood by keeping 
in mind only one possibility; cause & outcome. As a result it 
is easier for people to think counterfactually about an 
enabler than about a cause.  
An alternative explanation for why enablers are more 
mutable is that because enablers are not consistent with the 
possibility 'no enabler outcome' and causes are consistent 
with the possibility 'no cause outcome' people should 
recognise that the enabler is necessary for the outcome 
whereas the cause is not. Enablers tend to be preconditions 
and without them the cause will not have its effect. An 
enabler makes it possible for a cause to have its effect, when 
an enabler is removed then the cause can happen and it will 
not have the same effect, e.g. in one of the scenarios used in 
the experiment someone wore inappropriate shoes on a 
building site and as a consequence he broke his toe when a 
bag of cement was dropped on his foot, if we now imagine 
the same scenario without the wrong shoes then dropping 
the bag on his foot loses its potency. Here we might be 
getting to the heart of the matter, the relationship between 
causes and enablers is not a conjunctive one, instead the two 
factors are dependent on one another to have their effect. 
The cause cannot produce an effect without the presence of 
the appropriate enabler. 
Causal model theory (e.g. Sloman, 2005) assigns a central 
role to intervention. Mandel and Lehman (1996) argue that 
counterfactuals are more about how someone personally can 
prevent a similar outcome in the future and intervene 
whereas causal thoughts aid the prediction of events. 
Perhaps intervening on an enabler is somehow easier or 
requires less intervention than intervening on a cause. The 
question still arises as to why that would be the case. The 
difference in foreseeability of causes and enablers may 
provide an explanation. The causes in our scenarios were 
rated as more foreseeable than the enablers in bringing 
about the outcome. Foreseeable actions may be less likely to 
be mutated because they seem inevitable and therefore less 
mutable; perhaps an enabler carries less causal potency.  
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A different explanation is that people tend to mutate 
enablers rather than causes because enablers tend to occur 
prior to causes. This explanation is consistent with the 
finding that people tend to mutate the first event in a 
sequence of causally dependent events (Wells et al, 1987). 
At present we cannot fully rule out this possibility, however, 
we argue that causes and enablers are not related to one 
another like a causal chain of events. Enablers do not cause 
a cause to bring about an effect. Instead enablers work 
together with a cause to bring about an outcome. A 
systematic investigation in the future will provide more 
clarity on this matter. 
The experiment revealed that in each condition 
participants tended to assign higher blame ratings for causes 
than enablers. This finding is consistent with Mandel and 
Lehman (1996) who demonstrated a dissociation between 
causal and counterfactual thinking. However, Mandel and 
Lehman did not manipulate the controllability of the cause. 
Our findings suggest that this dissociation is markedly 
reduced in condition D where the cause was uncontrollable 
and the enabler was controllable, as blame ratings did not 
reliably differ. If blame ratings were merely associated with 
controllability then we would expect to see the opposite 
pattern to the blame ratings in condition B, where the cause 
is controllable and the enabler uncontrollable. However, in 
condition B we see the greatest discrepancy in blame ratings 
between causes and enablers. A comparison of the results 
for these two conditions suggests that in condition D, where 
the cause is uncontrollable, we merely see a reduction in the 
tendency to blame the cause, but this tendency is not 
eliminated. 
Across all four conditions participants rated the causal 
action as less socially acceptable than the enabling actions. 
Previous research suggests that people tend to generate 
more counterfactuals about socially undesirable actions 
(McCloy & Byrne, 2000; N’gbala & Branscombe, 1995) 
than socially desirable actions. Our findings go against this 
trend as participants generated more counterfactuals about 
the more socially acceptable enablers than the less socially 
acceptable causes. Hence, this finding provides further 
evidence for the special role played by enabling relations. 
The main aim of the experiment was to examine whether 
counterfactuals about enabling relations are distinct from 
counterfactuals about controllable actions. In addition to 
showing that they are indeed distinct, we have also provided 
further converging evidence for the idea that causes and 
enablers are logically distinct. Understanding the differences 
between causes and enablers is important, because, in our 
view, it is central to human conceptions of causality.  
In addition, understanding this distinction has implications 
in the legal domain. Neither British nor American law 
recognizes this distinction (e.g., Roberts & Zuckerman, 
2004) and as a result very divergent judgments are made in 
cases involving enablers (Johnson-Laird, 2006). One court 
decided that gun makers who negligently supplied guns to 
stores in States with weak gun laws were a cause of murders 
that criminals committed with the guns; whereas another 
court decided that a builder who negligently left an open lift 
shaft unguarded was not the cause of an accident when a 
young lad deliberately invited a stranger to step inside. 
However, people are sensitive to the distinction between 
causes and enablers and assign different amounts of blame 
and punishments to them (Frosch, Johnson-Laird, & 
Cowley, 2007). Understanding this distinction and the role it 
plays in bringing about an outcome may have implications 
for psychologists, philosophers and the legal domain. 
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Appendix 
Experimental materials for conditions A (cause and enabler both controllable) and C (cause and enabler both uncontrollable) 
with causes marked in bold and enablers marked in italics. 
 Controllable Uncontrollable 
Jane decided to take a different route home to her normal route. 
On the way she encountered a rough stretch of road that was 
being resurfaced and had a 10mph speed limit. Jane drove too 
quickly over this road, resulting in her getting a flat tyre.   
 
An accident on Jane’s normal route home forced her to take an 
alternate route. On the way she encountered a rough stretch of road 
where a lorry had shed its load. A nail got stuck in her tyre, resulting 
in her getting a flat tyre. 
Whilst working on a building site Tim was wearing trainers 
rather than the required steel-toed shoes, because he thought his 
trainers looked cooler. John carelessly threw a bag of cement 
over to Tim, which landed on his foot and broke his big toe.  
 
Whilst working on a building site Tim was wearing trainers rather 
than the required steel-toed shoes, because it was his first day. John 
lost his balance and dropped a bag of cement which landed on Tim’s 
foot and broke his big toe.  
Anna is on her way to a job interview and decides not to wear 
her rain mac as she does not like the look of it. As Anna is 
walking down the street, Phoebe, who is driving her van 
particularly fast, speeds straight through a puddle, splashing 
Anna and soaking her clothes. 
 
Anna is on her way to a job interview and is unable to wear her rain 
mac as her sister borrowed it without asking permission. As Anna is 
walking down the street, Phoebe, who is driving his van, swerves to 
avoid hitting a dog and drives straight into a puddle, splashing Anna 
and soaking her clothes. 
Oscar decides to take the lift to the top floor of the library 
because he is too lazy to take the stairs. When Oscar reaches 
the top floor the lift door gets stuck and won’t open because 
James, the lift maintenance worker, didn’t bother to oil the 
lift machinery that morning. 
 
Oscar has to take the lift to the top floor of the library because the 
stairs are closed for repairs. When Oscar reaches the top floor the lift 
door gets stuck and won’t open because James, the new lift 
maintenance worker, didn’t realise that the lift machinery had to be 
oiled every day.  
Richard is writing up his thesis and cannot be bothered to 
spend a few minutes backing it up to the University server. 
When he checks his emails he opens an email from a stranger 
with an attachment containing a virus which renders his 
computer and all the files on it useless. 
 
Richard is writing up his thesis and still hasn’t been given access to 
the University server, so he is unable to back it up. The virus checker 
is faulty and as a result he opens a file containing a virus which 
renders his computer and all the files on it useless. 
Kate took the decision to take the scenic route home rather than 
her usual route. When Kate came to a junction Tina, who was 
coming from a different direction, jumped a red light because 
she was in a hurry and crashed into her. 
 
A diversion forced Kate to take the scenic route home rather than her 
usual route. When Kate came to a junction Tina, who was coming 
from a different direction, jumped a red light because the brakes 
failed and crashed into her. 
Daniel threw a lighted cigarette into a bush. Just as the 
cigarette was going out, Joseph deliberately threw petrol on it. 
The resulting fire burnt down his neighbour’s house. 
Daniel accidentally dropped a lighted cigarette into a bush. Just as the 
cigarette was going out, Joseph, who was carrying a petrol canister, 
stumbled and spilled the petrol onto the bush. The resulting fire burnt 
down his neighbour’s house. 
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